Is it Turkey's Opportunity to Rise?

So what's up with Turkey these days? Is the caliphate rising?

Does Turkey have an opportunity to rise?

It has a large military and economy that, while only modestly growing, flashes the kind of potential few others in the region can. But more important, it has a massive geopolitical opportunity. With Russia bogged down in Ukraine, the United States seeking to reduce its global footprint, Iran suffering losses throughout the region that have been complicated by its internal leadership transition, and Israel reeling from crises at home and abroad, Turkey can exploit these openings in any direction in which it has fundamental interests.

Turkey has exposed its imperial ambitions recalling its Ottoman past. The retreat of Russia from Turkey's borders--long a source of threats to Turkey--is the main factor for giving Turkey an opportunity. America still seems active in the region even if its presence in CENTCOM is less than elevated War on Terror levels and if America is not as dominant in Europe (big if); Iran's problems are temporary whether or not the mullahs fall; and Israel has reduced threats to it from its military campaigns that will eventually end, so I don't really see "reeling."

I worry if Turkey's rise under Erdogan means it will be an Islamist rise with a dream of restoring the Caliphate and supplanting Arab dominance--despite being a tiny minority--of Islam. Still, it isn't all glory on Turkey's path, as the potential is caveated:

Given Turkey’s domestic problems, whether it can capitalize remains to be seen. 

We'll see if Turkey makes noises about a role in securing Islam's holy places in Mecca and Medina, as Iran has long demanded as the self-proclaimed voice of the Shia, as a step to leading all of Islam. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

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China's Biggest Enemy is Geography

China has made a lot of enemies around its borders. Which seems odd when you consider that geography is already China's enemy.*

China is constrained by geography in its drive for global dominance:

In an age defined by artificial intelligence, long-range missiles, naval modernization, and other advancements, geography may seem like an outdated constraint, a relic conquered by modern technology and global ambition.

There are many who assume so. However, the reality is different for many states whose geography remains an overarching shadow over their policies; ever-present in the minds of the men who navigate the ship of state. Nowhere is this more painfully evident than in China’s maritime ambitions.

Despite unprecedented economic and strategic rise, the seas remain stubbornly resistant to domination. What we’re witnessing is the slow return of a geopolitical truth long articulated by Robert D. Kaplan: that geography still defines the outer limits of strategic ambition.

I've long noted China has a bad geographic position and that I wouldn't trade places with China.

America by contrast is free to project power globally because of its superior geographic position. And one thing that freedom allows it to do is maintain Eurasian shields to keep enemies across the Atlantic and Pacific.

That Great Wall off of China's coast is America's. And there is another wall.

*Really, the Chinese Communist Party is China's greatest enemy given that for the CCP, its survival takes precedence over China's survival. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. You know you want to. 

NOTE: Illustration from the article. 

The EU Wants an Army

The European Union never tires of  identifying a crisis that only a stronger European Union bureaucracy can solve.

The European Union (EU) wants an army:

In February, the Brussels-based​​ think tank Bruegel estimated that 300,000 more troops and an annual defence spending hike of at least €250 billion would be needed to deter Russian aggression.

The lack of a unified command and control is a significant handicap. For the same reason, the combat power of 300,000 US troops is substantially greater than that of the equivalent number of European troops distributed across 29 national armies. 

The Europeans already have a unified command-and-control network to organize the defense of the continent. It's called NATO. The follow-up statement that Europe has 29 national armies is not a command-and-control issue. It's an attack on 29 national armies that would be "solved" with an EU army that destroys nation-state identity. The existence of national European militaries is another faux crisis to exploit.

The EU is trying to take the credit for NATO-set European defense spending levels. Sadly for the EU, there is no pan-European identity to unify its people and troops. Which will make such an army no more effective than the World War I Austro-Hungarian multi-ethnic army.

Don't forget that the "strategic autonomy" the EU wants--but that is only briefly mentioned in the article--is a means to eject America from Europe. For American interests, NATO must be vigorously led by America to make European troops effective--and for other reasons. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. You know you want to. 

NOTE: I made the image with Bing. 

The Modularized Missile Boat

My Modularized Auxiliary Cruiser proposal to bring more missiles to the sea control fight has been updated and shrunk by the Navy for modularized payloads on unmanned surface vessels.

Interesting:

The U.S. Navy unveiled its new Modular Attack Surface Craft program, which would likely see unmanned surface vessels carrying missiles long distances at sea.

The program calls for the development of a rugged, flexible and high-capacity unmanned surface vessel, or USV, capable of hauling a variety of “containerized payloads,” per a July 28 solicitation. Such payloads would include the maximum equivalent of more than four 40-foot containers — cargo that would roughly equal the size of the Navy’s anti-ballistic missile system, the Mark 70 Mod 1 Payload Delivery System. 

These are smaller versions of Modularized Auxiliary Cruisers, as I proposed years ago. If we really are on a short deadline to be ready for China, this is the only way to get hulls in the water before then. But they aren't silver bullets.

Another article has this detail:

The most relevant to the service’s requirements is a solution for an unmanned ship that can support a payload of two 40-foot ISO containers and cruise at a sailing speed of 25 knots for up to 2,500 nautical miles in sea state four. The other two concepts examine different payloads, from one to four ISO containers without specifying range or speed. The Navy wants responses to the solicitation by Aug. 11. 

For me, it will be interesting to see how large such vessels have to be for sailing long distances at sea rather than leaving port and almost immediately beginning the fight, as our overseas allies must do.

And for wartime emergency conversions, my original proposal still has merit. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. You know you want to. 

NOTE: The photo of the Ranger and Nomad USVs is from the second article.

The Goose Isn't Sexy, But It Deserves More Love

As we swoon over FPV drones, don't forget the firepower that an older--but modernized--recoilless rifle provides the light infantry platoon.

Spare some love for the Carl Gustav recoilless rifle:

The Carl Gustaf Multi-Role Anti-Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon System (MAAWS) is a remarkable weapon system for light infantry forces. But this weapon is also one of the least understood systems across the Infantry. ...

The M3A1 Carl Gustaf is the most powerful weapon system in a rifle platoon. As the Army searches for ways to increase the lethality of the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT), one of the solutions is already sitting quietly in our arms rooms, waiting to get the attention it deserves.

It is useful to kill a variety of targets. The AT-4 was originally a single shot anti-tank weapon derived from the Carl Gustav recoilless rifle. It was a bigger LAW. And now the Army has a bazooka-style reloadable weapon like the original.

And notwithstanding seeing the then-new AT-4 demonstrated in basic training, it took me decades to grok that the designation was derived from its 84mm round size. FFS. I am forever shamed by that blind spot.

Anyway. 

One thing I like about the Carl Gustav is that it reinforces the infantry close combat role rather than being a potential distraction as I believe drones pushed too far down the organizational chart could be. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. You know you want to. 

NOTE: Picture from article. 

The Winter War of 2022 Seeks Reassurance

We are a long way from actual peace--assuming Putin is desperate enough to agree to only partially digest  Ukraine--but it is close enough to think about how NATO states can prevent Russia from thinking of "peace" as a chance to reload and have another go at victory in a few years. Can the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) provide the model for a Joint Reassurance Force (JRF)?

On the battlefield, The Russians continue to push forward even as Ukraine has mounted some effective local counter-attacks. It is reported that Russian casualties are down as Russia scales back attacks. Which makes the slow advances by Russia rather disturbing. Yet Russia is running out of summer for their summer offensive to achieve something decisive.

In the air, Ukraine is focusing on Russian oil infrastructure. Ukraine has new weapons with greater reach. Can its campaign be sustained and will it affect Russian battlefield capabilities? 

Away from the mud and blood, leadership looks past achieving the end of shooting--even at the price of allowing Russia to keep much or all of its ill-gotten gain--to how NATO can prevent Russia from resuming its invasion. Realistically, Ukrainians increasingly are unwilling to die to recover that territory.

And at least for the Russian-occupied Donbas region, reintegrating people who have fought and died for Russia for over a decade now would be difficult to say the least. 

I can dream of a Ukrainian operation that puts Ukraine back in control of its territory north of Crimea that at least restores Ukraine's access to the Sea of Azov. But unless Ukraine with NATO's help has been preparing for such a counteroffensive the last two years, it will remain a dream. Ukrainian support for continuing the war until everything is liberated is gone. Defend? Sure. But ending the war even if Russia is deeper inside Ukraine is clearly a rising hope despite the dangers of that outcome.

But at the very least, nobody should recognize the legality of Russia's conquest even if the reality of that occupation is accepted for the time being.

The immediate task is to design and field a force of NATO troops that can reassure Ukraine that it will get help from the West even in the absence of Article V NATO guarantees. The hope is that the prospect of killing NATO troops in a non-NATO role will deter Russia from attacking. 

Of course, you know my view on the weakness of designing a deterrent force rather than a force that can win. And if the European force is limited to deploying in western Ukraine, it is worthless. It is not worth putting that force into Ukraine unless the idea is that in response to Russian violations of the ceasefire the force is repeatedly moved east and given a more robust role. But since it seems equally likely European governments would ignore Russian violations in order to avoid doing that, I would not want a pretend deterrence in western Ukraine.

Still, if the force goes into eastern Ukraine and has a role in making the Russians hesitate to attack again, NATO must think about the force. 

First, what authority should the force be under? I suggest that the Joint Expeditionary Force now entirely composed  of NATO members should be the model. Britain is the driving force of the JEF sub-alliance:

There are ten JEF Participant Nations (all of which are NATO members). These nations are sovereign states that come together to respond quickly and decisively to an emerging crisis. Development is enabled through political and strategic engagement, specialist working groups, collective training opportunities and interactions with Defence Attaches, Liaison Officers, the JEF Secretariat and front-line personnel.

With NATO doctrine as its baseline, the JEF has strong working relationships with partners and provides a gearing between nations and NATO, where issues can be discussed regionally and quickly reacted to without the requirement for lengthy decision-making processes.

What countries should be in a new Joint Reassurance Force? I think that it should be a European force but not the European Union. I would include in JRF all the NATO states bordering Russia and the Black Sea, plus Germany and France. Ideally, Ukraine should be a member or at least have a solid legal foundation for integrating JRF and Ukrainian military capabilities to present Russia with a force too tough to defeat. 

One major European power taking the lead. Britain is already the leader of JEF with a Baltic and Nordic focus (and I anticipate Britain would be better employed preparing for Russian little green men in Estonia, as I discussed in Army magazine), so I rule Britain out; and I'd like Italy to take the lead in the Mediterranean Sea. 

Practically speaking, either France or Germany should have the job. Although Germany might have too much baggage that far east. Russian propaganda writes itself, no? But France is ... well, France. And because Russia will spout propaganda no matter who is in charge, I'd go with Germany. Russia earned that choice.

Putting border states in JRF prevents Russia from targeting JRF as if it is completely unrelated to  NATO. Perhaps Russia could restrict a renewed war to Ukraine's territory even if it fights JRF units. But if Russia tried to expand the war to punish JRF states directly, it would run into a NATO Article V wall. 

JRF should have a close working relationship with NATO in order to reinforce the indirect Article V guarantee worry for Russia should it resume its war against Ukraine. And that relationship would allow America to provide advanced air power; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); logistics; and command and control functions to JRF through NATO. Indeed, it was reported that America is willing to support Europeans along those lines:

The Financial Times (FT) reported on August 26 that official Ukrainian and European sources stated that senior US officials told European officials recently that the United States would be prepared to contribute "strategic enablers," such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); command and control (C2); and air defense assets, to support a future European-led deployment on the ground in postwar Ukraine as part of security guarantees for Ukraine. 

I would not want JRF ground units in eastern Ukraine manning the front. Russians would eventually attack them to sap Western will to maintain their positions. I have doubts Western states would allow their forces to engage in combat so why make them shooting gallery targets? Anyone remember NATO state Afghanistan campaign caveats notwithstanding invoking Article V?

And just as bad, Western forces on the front would serve to restrain Ukrainian units from fighting back as Russia began the process of eroding Ukraine's JRF protection. Recall the constant mutual gnawing on the Donbas front from 2015 to 2021--which Ukraine was slowly winning (and note my prediction should Russia escalate--as it did in 2022).

European ability to provide ground combat units is limited so let's just admit that rather than pretend there will be more. The JRF would include in its land component the French-German brigade and two composite maneuver brigades built around one French and one German brigade headquarters and fires assets. Other JRF countries would contribute battalions and companies to fill out those composite brigades in the manner of the Cadre Brigade Combat Teams that I recommended (see my Army magazine article) the United States Army form to gather scattered NATO maneuver battalions into more capable brigades that could be easily integrated into American divisions. 

Ukrainian maneuver and support brigades would fill out that JRF-commanded division-sized "corps" in the pattern of Ukraine's expanded corps organization. This force would function as a reserve unit in Ukraine's defense plans.

Separate JRF battalions would man key portions of the frontline in a local reserve capacity, using aerial drones to monitor the Russians on the other side of the line of control. NATO ISR assets would of course support this mission.

I know the Poles, Baltic nations, and Finland are loath--if not actually terrified--to part with any of their troops. But other NATO--including American and Canadian--ground units should replace Norwegian, Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, or Polish units dispatched to staff the JRF in order to maintain a constant level of forces in those NATO frontline states. And bonus for spreading the risk of defying Russia, no?

Yet right now, a robust if small land force is not planned for what is being called Multinational Force Ukraine (MFU):

Immediately, one can see that the MFU deployment has been scaled down from initial estimates, and is probably not going to be a large divisional-sized land force for actively deterring the Russians, nor even really a small ‘tripwire’ force focused on dying heroically so that NATO would be dragged into conflict.3 ‘NATO Forward Land Force Ukraine’ it is not.4

That lack of land forces will not reassure Ukraine in any way. So I will stand by my minimal proposal. Do read all of Palmer's piece (I wrote this before reading his excellent piece), which also suggests JEF as a model. Which reassures me on my view on that. But Palmer rightly argues that regardless of European ability to staff such a reassurance force, we really need to nail down what the objective is for the force. Sending a force designed to simulate Western resolve will be Task Force Smithed if we later imagine/hope it is a robust force with more capabilities than we actually gave it.

Obviously, NATO should help modernize, organize, train, and equip Ukraine's military to be the primary force for resisting Russia. That's reassurance.

The air policing missions would be NATO-led (rather than JRF), including the United States in a leading role, and have the benefit of NATO experience in the Baltic States to provide alliance reassurance in the air. Obviously, tight cooperation would be needed with Ukrainian air defenses to deconflict missions and avoid friendly fire. Which would also promote wartime integration should Russia not be serious about peace. Equally obviously, the Ukraine mission would be far larger than the Baltic mission. So that's a challenge. But if NATO can't manage that, we have bigger problems than reassuring Ukraine.

Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey would provide the core of JRF naval power with others able to join for the air missions over the Black Sea, including non-JRF NATO forces. Other JRF nations might participate with modularized auxiliary cruisers (which I called The Black Sea Queen) flagged by those Black Sea NATO states to avoid Montreaux Convention restrictions on non-Black Sea powers operating in the Black Sea. 

Or am I huffing my own fumes to think that might work? 

And in an interesting twist, the United States is discussing with European allies the possibility of sending armed American private military companies to build fortifications for Ukraine. 

With such a force Ukraine might actually be reassured and Russia might have a moment of lucidity to pivot to face China, which is the real threat to Russian territorial integrity.

But first Putin has to have a moment of lucidity and agree to actual peace in Ukraine. Thus far he displays no signs of that:

The Kremlin is demanding that Russia have a veto over any Western security guarantees for Ukraine in an effort to undermine ongoing US, European, and Ukrainian efforts to establish conditions for lasting peace in Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on August 20 that any serious discussions on Western security guarantees for Ukraine without Russian input are a “road to nowhere” and that Russia “cannot agree” that now-proposed "collective security issues" can be resolved without Russia, effectively demanding a Russian veto over Western security guarantees for Ukraine.

We'll see what American weapons Ukraine will get to hit Putin with a clue bat--as Trump suggested after Russia threw up more obstacles--and make him see reason. Or alternatively to hurt Russia badly enough that Russia's opinion is worthless. 

In the meantime, NATO should continue its "candid discussions" to formulate a plan for what the force will look like and what it will do. Without asking for Russia's permission.

UPDATE (Monday): I should have included this for the air component, but could an international unit of F-16s staffed by private military contractors be part of that? I suggested this Flying Tigers solution earlier in the Winter War of 2022 to jump-start getting F-16s into action for Ukraine. 

UPDATE (Tuesday): Here we go:

Ukraine's allies in the so-called Coalition of the Willing aim to define their security guarantees for Kiev during talks in Paris on Thursday under the leadership of French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

I focused on NATO members for the JRF, but perhaps the non-NATO CotW members could support the air effort as well as help with financing.

UPDATE (Tuesday): Interesting:

The Russian military command reportedly redeployed relatively "elite" naval infantry and airborne (VDV) forces to Donetsk Oblast from northern Sumy Oblast and the Kherson direction.

How much has Russia thinned out the Kherson direction? 

Because I just can't believe Ukraine with all of NATO's help and advice is counting on a strategy of sitting on the defensive and counting on Russia breaking first. But perhaps that's my failure to accept reality.

UPDATE (Wednesday): "Concept" is easy:

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte believes the Coalition of the Willing, an alliance of nations prepared to deter Russia from attacking again once peace is reached in Ukraine, will come to an agreement soon on a concept for security guarantees for Kiev. 

Still, a concept that rejects a Russian veto is good. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. 

NOTE: I finally tried MapChart that I've had bookmarked for ages to make the map at the top.

Weekend Data Dump

I post at The Dignified Rant: Evolved on Substack. Help me out by subscribing and by liking and sharing posts. I also post here on TDR seven days a week, including Weekend Data Dump and Winter War of 2022. I occasionally post short data dump-type items on my Substack "Notes" section.  

In case you missed it on Substack: Dueling Insufficiencies

In case you missed it on Substack: The Enduring Need for Trigger-Pulling Soldiers

In case you missed it on Substack: If You Have to Ask the Price of Battlefield Victory, You Can't Afford It

In case you missed it on Substack: Crawl, Walk, Run, and Then Drive the PLA Into the Sea

Restructuring the military for a multi-theater war. An early publication of mine during the 1990s peace dividend warned about wrongly believing we can fight in more than one theater, using Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980 as a cautionary tale.

CRS reports to Congress on Army small drone projects and DOD counter-drone projects. 

The Army's move to cut back on helicopter reliance. 

Strengthening Army division-level force multipliers: "As the Army is reintroducing electronic warfare capability to formations, it’s looking to give them more cyber weapons as well." 

Vietnam may exceed Chinese island-building in the South China Sea. Good. As long as Vietnam doesn't try to use fake islands to expand territorial claims. 

Sh*t got real in the South China Sea. 

The Air Force wants "rapidly deployable air base defense systems to thwart drones over fixed installations and defend Airmen at austere airfields from enemy missiles." Good. But are the basics taken care of?

The Michigan Air National Guard needs work on its base at Selfridge to be ready for F-15EX aircraft to replace retiring A-10s. 

Britain wants to modify surplus Warrior infantry fighting vehicles to be remotely operated or autonomous mine-clearing vehicles. You can't have your maneuver units stacked up behind a slowly created breach.

The Marines are buying 31 more of their new Amphibious Combat Vehicles armed with 30mm auto-cannons. 

China's urge to erase its "century of humiliation."

Reconstitution under fire and with a deadline: "The 1973 Yom Kippur War, which saw the IDF lose more than eight hundred main battle tanks and one hundred attack aircraft in three weeks of fighting, validated the timeless imperative for modern militaries to maintain systematic reconstitution as a vital capability." 

The author makes good points. But NATO expansion didn't make Russia aggressive. Russia revived Russian aggression. Because Russia's paranoia has no natural territorial limits short of the Atlantic. And probably not even then. The Mongols advancing from Asia through Russia deeply damaged Russians.

Drawing a line in the South China Sea? "Following Marcos’ visit to the United States, the Philippine-U.S. defense cooperation is unfolding with remarkable momentum." 

"Putin's long game"! LOL Putin failed to quickly conquer Ukraine and is now hanging on fearful of peace whether he wins on the battlefield or not because of the heavy price in Russian lives, reputation, the economy, and military power. Any failure by our enemies is dressed up in the best light. 

Last week I mentioned a sizable American military deployment near Venezuela. If you thought Trinidad and Tobago, collect your prize. Of course, Guyana is the focus of Venezuelan desire and American worry.

I don't agree with everything, but Friedman is right that "the strategy pursued under presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump – that is, supplying intelligence and weapons but not troops to Ukraine – was the rational policy." Before the war I cited logistics but said maybe western Ukraine is worth risking war. 

The Panamanian ambassador to the U.S. defends its canal security relationship with America and Panama's cooperation on sanctions on Russia and Iran.

The Chinese Communist Party doesn't care: "China’s slowdown puts the world economy at risk[.]" But it cares if the basis of its claim for a monopoly of political party is undermined. What will stoking nationalism to replace that require? And are official statistics accurate? 

A Chinese blockade of Taiwan would require opposition frigates to escort ships through the blockade. How many frigates could be replaced with modularized auxiliary cruisers and dis-aggregated "Navy in a box" systems spread out on a number of cargo ships in a convoy? 

Karma strikes down Russia's 2025 harvest. Tip to Instapundit. But I read that World War I Russian food shortages were driven by bad government policies that discouraged farmers from selling at a loss. And Russian grain production shot up after communism. So lighten up on global warming propaganda.

Is America's ability to borrow its way through spending desires about to collapse? All my adult life that's been the prediction. The prediction has been correct. Only the timing has been wrong. How's your pucker factor going?

Will the French government collapse over an effort to control spending?  

Good point: "Armies should train for the battlefields they fight on. But the U.S. Army’s training sites don’t replicate the terrain that the Army is most likely to fight on, such as the Baltic states, Korea and Taiwan, warns a U.S. Army officer." I've addressed the Baltics, Korea, and Taiwan here and here.

While this is broadly within the National Guard's lanes (my signal unit had riot control training), I'd like deployments to be brief surges until locals take over: "President Donald Trump on Monday ordered the National Guard in each state to create a quick-response force to quell protests and deter crime[.]"

The usual suspect: "A Russian-crewed cargo ship, HAV DOLPHIN, has attracted some attention after its movements coincided with drone incursions over German military installations[.]" 

Norway will help Germany buy American Patriot air defense systems for Ukraine. 

Britain extended its training program for Ukrainian troops to at least the end of 2026. 

Reach out and touch someone? "the Trump administration last week approved the sale of 3,350 [150-280 miles-range] ERAM missiles to Ukraine." 

I suspect that Russia is doing this mostly to try to stop drone attacks. But the collateral damage is welcome. And they'd do it even if not at war with Ukraine.

I think this is needless but trendy panic, but if it pushes Britain to rearm, that's good. Good luck trusting "Europe".

This is how abusive ruling elites get introduced to gallows set up in a courtyard. Will the British people really let this slide? Tip to Instapundit. 

Xi will welcome Modi and Putin to China's Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting. China claims Russian land and China claims Indian land. A sound basis for an alliance, eh? 

Both lie about what Israel is doing in Gaza to destroy Israel: "These are dangerous days for Israel. It faces a two-pronged attack. From one flank come the radical Islamists, from the other Western intellectuals." I knew this post would be useful. 

Colombia is drawing closer to Venezuela. For nearly forty years we helped Colombia defeat communist narco-insurgents. Then Colombia threw away the victory. Our government was addled enough to support that stupidity.

Venezuela's military is crappy in so many ways. Very informative.

Trump failed to stop the Houthi anti-shipping attacks, so punish its enablers. But escalating against Iran and/or China as the authors suggest to defeat the Houthi is Sicilian Expedition-level folly. Will Egypt act with Saudi air support and money? 

True: "A fundamental problem facing the US military is that the services have fielded capable, long-range missile systems, but only possesses limited deep-reach Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Targeting (ISRT) capabilities, limiting the effective employment of long-range missile systems."

The developing brown skies campaign gets more complicated: "Ukrainian forces need to embrace systemic changes in conducting aerial reconnaissance in the wake of increased [Russian] deployment of interceptor systems. The [Ukrainian] servicemember warned that Russian interceptors can degrade the quality and quantity of Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance."

Brits to Americans: We don't need a written constitution like you colonials. Wait. What? Tip to Instapundit.

Iraq intends to deport a lot of foreign nationals affiliated with or connected to ISIL.

China has ramped up its military presence in the South China Sea that it illegally claims after one of its warships collided with one of its coast guard ships while chasing a Philippine Coast Guard ship recently.

Finland and Poland are thinking of allowing bogs to return, following the example of Ukraine which blew a dam north of Kiev to restore a drained bog, blocking a Russian advance on Kiev early in the invasion. The Baltic states could do that, too. Thank goodness climate activists won't complain.

It is difficult to get the Taiwanese people to worry about a Chinese invasion anytime soon. Are they correct? Or will the shock of invasion numb them into passivity and defeat? 

That won't work: "The Lebanese government will reportedly attempt to persuade rather than coerce Hezbollah to disarm." I've long thought Israel hitting government targets while going after Hezbollah was counter-productive. But if the government won't disarm a weakened Hezbollah, both are targets.

More: "Two sources briefed on the plan told the Reuters news agency that the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie and the nuclear-powered fast attack submarine USS Newport News will arrive in Caribbean waters by early next week." The cruiser provides command and control capabilities, too, I believe.

A full time reservist should be removed from active duty service if he thinks posting on political issues is his priority. As a part-time reservist he will be free to opine when not on duty. 

Interesting: "CRS questions whether converting IBCTs into Mobile Brigade Combat Teams would affect the Army’s 14 active component IBCTs and 20 National Guard IBCTs 'with potential operational impacts in terms of organization and capabilities for Army infantry formations.'" 

Forward defense: "Australian forces will be able to access Philippine military bases via an upcoming defense cooperation agreement[.]"

American diplomat: "The US is expected to support the renewal of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission for another year, but the international force is 'not the answer' to Lebanon’s security woes[.]" If it can't disarm Hezbollah while it is weak, it truly is UNIFAIL.

Sadly, turning the F-35 off and then on was not an option at altitude. The danger of a smart plane hopefully doesn't outweigh its advantages in combat. Hopefully an enemy couldn't hack the plane and introduce that problem during combat.

Well good luck with that: "Venezuela on Tuesday deployed warships and drones to patrol the country's coastline[.]" 

But is the association worried about military capability or association advantage? "The head of Germany's Bundeswehr Association said a government plan to boost Germany's armed forces is inadequate[.]"

An Africa Spring? "What began as a localised protest [in Angola], a taxi drivers’ strike over a steep fuel price hike has spiralled into a full-blown crisis marked by looting, destruction, and a mass exodus of Chinese nationals." Tip to Instapundit. Could a PLAN carrier and amphibious group deploy there? 

Even as Iran's mullah's remain vulnerable at home, they spread death and mayhem worldwide--as Australia discovered. Tip to Instapundit.

Maybe: "The Chinese do not do anything quickly without ample strategic foresight. They plod along, simmering with irritation, and always talk a big game. They do rehearse amphibious landings to overthrow the government of Taiwan, but that doesn’t mean an attack will come in the next year or two." Foresight?!

Europe's century of humiliation? No. Not Europe--the European Union. Geographic Europe could be fine if the EU humiliation leads to its collapse so free European states can embark on a century of renewal.

The Army is confident it can protect overseas bases from drones, but is working with the British to design counter-drone systems for the Army on the move. 

Is "key terrain" now non-terrain factors? Don't over-think it. There have always been critical resources, infrastructure, and industrial capabilities. By all means study and cope with that. But military forces operate on, over, and around actual terrain.

Germany opens a new plant to produce 155mm ammunition. 

The new CNO wants a new fleet design. But will we have a sea power debate or just another fruitless carrier debate?

China is getting bizarrely repressive. What motivates that? And how will that shape China?

Whoa: "The open-source intelligence project Oryx has visually confirmed the first recorded loss of a Russian D-74 122mm howitzer, a rare artillery system dating back to the 1950s." 

The Russians intercepted an American P-8A maritime patrol aircraft over the Black Sea. The information this plane collects is crucial for keeping the Russian navy from freely using the sea.

China is unveiling a new Dong Feng-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of reaching Guam. 

A line in the sea: "Australian, Canadian and Philippine warships and fighter jets worked together to defeat simulated air threats on Wednesday near Scarborough Shoal[.]" 

Did killing JCIDS remove paperwork requirements that clogged military modernization?  

The European Union's Orwellian "Media Freedom Act." Gosh, what was Vance thinking, eh?

Interesting news from Turkey: "The Steel Dome combines [mobile] sea- and land-based defense platforms and radar systems within a single network to detect and intercept aerial weapons systems." It must not include the S-400 that Turkey bought.

Huh: "IDF soldiers rappelled from four helicopters to a military post near Kiswa, south of Damascus" in a two-hour operation. They carried "search equipment" but no word if anything was airlifted out. They "dismantled devices used by Turkey to spy on Israel."

Islamists are invaders wherever they go. The British once would have fought invaders on the beaches, in the hills, and in the fields and streets. Now they arrest a desperate little girl who dares to resist. I am heart broken and ashamed. Tip to Instapundit. 

An Army Apache in Europe fired for the first time a Spike non-line of sight missile. Now, terrain is a form of protection for helicopters. 

Shocking: "Russian private mercenary operations in Mali have sowed resentment within the West African nation's army and military government, caused security lapses, and failed to yield any mining concessions [for Russia]." 

Venezuela has ties to Iran. I've mentioned this before, but it bears repeating.

Many decades later, a benefit of saving South Korea rolls in when we really need them: "Two South Korean shipbuilding titans are throwing their weight into new efforts to revitalize U.S. shipbuilding[.]" 

Russia learns: "Russia says it carried out a drone boat attack on a Ukrainian Navy reconnaissance ship in the mouth of the Danube River[.]" 

Canada wants submarines. 

Ukraine used suicide drones to detonate mines and ammunition that the Russians planted in case they needed to destroy two bridges.

China patrols the waters around Scarborough Shoal to enforce physical control of territory they illegally claim to own. 

Seventy years of U-2 service, and one plane set a distance and duration record. 

The Air Force says it can solve the "'“Valley of Death' problem—the gulf between the invention of an innovative new technology and its deployment at scale[.]"

Unless local forces are prepared to overthrow the dictator Maduro, the small sea-based force America has ordered near Venezuela aren't going to liberate the country. Even if a Marine and Army division follow up initial attacks. 

Will European governments halt open immigration, expel criminals and Islamists, and compel assimilation? Or will the governments fight their own angry native citizens besieged by the functional invaders? And what about enacting cheap energy and economic growth policies?

I think it is silly to say a PLA parade will reveal anything of use about China's military capability. 

The American "New Right" sounds a lot like the old Left that never saw an enemy--if it could even describe a "friend we haven't made yet" that way--it wanted to resist. 

China's plan to build a road between Afghanistan and China through their narrow border will pose security problems for China. 

Can the Navy and Coast Guard expand by subcontracting ship components that "fully leverages the capabilities of small and medium-sized shipyards across the country"?

The second Columbia-class SSBN is now under construction. 

The Army will deploy its Typhon missile system to Japan for the first time in an exercise. 

Breathe, people. 

Has the war of attrition in Ukraine "benefited China in every possible way"? In many ways, yes. But is China really happy that Russia woke up America and the West to their insufficient defense industrial base?   

Is Russia's Zapad 2025 exercise a means to finally absorb Belarus and complete the Anschluss? Lukashenko's resistance to Putin has slowed but not stopped Putin's ambitions.

If India wants to finally resolve its biggest defense problem of the 2010s, this may help: "India is preparing to launch a landmark partnership with France to co-develop and manufacture a next-generation jet engine for its fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA)[.]" 

That's gonna leave a mark: "The IDF currently assesses that the entire cabinet of the Houthi cabinet — including the prime minister and 12 other ministers — were likely killed in yesterday’s strike in Yemen[.]" Tip to Instapundit.

Apparently, the Navy want to complicate logistics by mounting Army air defense missiles on a ship rather than Navy air defense missiles.

The Philippines opened a "forward operating base in Mahatao on Batan," a small island between Luzon and Taiwan. Task Force X would find that useful.

I wonder what the Russians were delivering? 

Nobody will get worked up over this because Israel isn't involved: "An extensive earthen wall is being built around the besieged Sudanese city of el-Fasher and is intended to trap people inside[.]" Being non-Israeli is a license to kill from the sainted international community--as Hamas understands all too well.

New NATO member Finland will wisely dump pre-Nazi swastika emblems--an ancient symbol the Nazis adopted--part of a few remaining air force units. Don't make Putin's false propaganda too easy, eh?

The U.S. and South Korea are discussing returning a small number of American tactical nuclear gravity bombs to South Korean territory. 

Is there a chance Iran will dissolve in a civil war should the mullah regime collapse? Tip to Instapundit.

Israel continues to hit Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. Unless Lebanon takes control of Hezbollah's strongholds and neuters the terror state-within-a-state, the Lexington Rule holds.

Interesting: "Healey stated that F-15s from the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) will soon be stationed in the UK, accompanied by supporting transport aircraft, with plans for unit-to-unit exchanges alongside the RAF." Tip to Cracking Defence.

This is a weird hit from a new Brazil user, no? "https://thedignifiedrant.blogspot.com/2021/AIS+(Automated+Identification+System)" 

I knew the Air Force and Navy store older planes and ships just in case. I had forgotten the Army does that, too, with 26,000 armored and other vehicles stored in the desert. 

The U.S. government is talking to Europeans about sending American armed private military companies to build fortifications for Ukraine. 

My entries are crowding my maximums again. I must resolve (again) to be briefer. 

Are "Snapback" Sanctions Legal?

We're going to get an answer to a question I've had since the awful Iran Nuclear Deal of 2015 (a.k.a. JCPOA) was put in place. Namely, whether "snapback" sanctions are legal under the United Nations charter. I suspect the answer is they are not.

We are at the end of the month when stuff is supposed to happen:

It is unclear if the E3 [NOTE: the United Kingdom, Germany, and France]  will initiate the dispute resolution process outlined in the JCPOA or directly refer Iran's non-compliance to the UNSC. The dispute resolution process can take up to 35 days and involves a series of steps that aim to resolve non-compliance issues.[7] The E3 can choose to engage in the dispute resolution process and then refer the issue to the UNSC if it believes that Iran continues to show "significant non-performance." The E3 can, conversely, bypass the dispute resolution process and directly refer the non-compliance issue to the UNSC. The E3 would be required to include a description of "the good-faith efforts the [E3] made to exhaust the dispute resolution process" when they refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution.

Of course, the mere fact that the sanctions aren't already in place despite years shows they did not in fact snap back after it was clear Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons despite its commitment not to do so. Tell me, will Russia and China insist that the E3 did not in fact exhaust the dispute resolution process? Will Russia and China deny Iran is guilty of "significant non-performance" in the JCPOA?

But more basically, what about the ability to put UN Security Council sanctions back in place without an additional Security Council vote to impose them? That is, can one Security Council essentially require a future Security Council to do its bidding by inverting the resolution process? I've long suspected that is not legal under the UN charter, as I explained in my review of the published deal:

Page 20 has the interesting part on "snapback" sanctions. First off, no already gained benefits will be lost by Iran.

This provision says that the UNSC has 30 days to vote to continue lifting sanctions or the old sanctions resolutions are reimposed, unless the UNSC says otherwise.

Further, any lawful contracts signed are not retroactively cancelled. So unless Iran is clueless, they will lock in long-term deals that will survive the reimposition of sanctions.

Also, the deal says that Iran will consider any reimposition of sanctions as grounds to abandon the deal in whole or in part.

And let me add a question I've asked before. Can the United Nations charter be amended by this deal to carve out an exception to the veto power of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council?

Here's what the Chapter V, Article 27 of the UN charter says about the veto:

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Because I can see the Russians or Chinese objecting to the whole notion that UNSC resolutions can be reimposed after 30 days of inaction by the Security Council. What do we do when the Russians and Chinese (probably correctly, but it has been a long time since I had an international law class) argue that this deal provision is invalid and that no sanctions resolutions can go into effect without 9 votes, including the concurrence of the five permanent members, and they will not go along with it?

I think China and Russia--and maybe France depending on their mood that day--will argue that future Security Council authority cannot be signed away in any deal no matter who approves it.

I think this nuclear deal provision was a false safeguard designed to get the agreement passed and not designed to stop Iran's nuclear ambitions. I hope I am wrong. 

Still, the E3 have begun the sacred "process".  And Iran begins their process in their so-called parliament:

The bill would require Iran to leave the NPT and the Additional Protocol, end all negotiations with the United States and the E3, and terminate cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Have a super sparkly day. 

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: You may also like to read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved. Go ahead and subscribe to it. You know you want to. 

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.